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RESTRAINT AND COERCION: EXECUTION OF A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACT BY A
MINORITY UNION
THE National Labor Relations Board has recently held that a union
commits an unfair labor practice by the simple act of signing a collective
bargaining contract by which it is recognized as exclusive bargaining
agent at a time when the union does not represent a majority of the
employees affected by the agreement. This result follows even if the
union believes in good faith that it does represent a majority of the
employees.
In Bernard-Altmann Texas Corporation,' a local of the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union had been trying unsuccessfully 2 for
ten months to organize a small knitting firm in San Antonio, Texas. In
August 1957, the union and the employer executed a "memorandum of
understanding" recognizing the union as exclusive bargaining agent for
a unit of production and shipping employees. At the time of signing,
the union held i58 authorization cards from a bargaining unit which the
union believed to contain a total of 286 employees. It was later dis-
covered that this total was incorrect? and that the union did not in fact
hold cards from a majority of the employees in the unit. The Board,
while assuming that the union entertained a good faith belief in its
majority status, nevertheless held that by signing the contract the union
committed an act of unlawful restraint and coercion within the meaning
of section 8(b) (i) (A).4
1 12. N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1959).
'In July 1957, some of the employees walked off the job to protest a wage reduction.
It appears that the union did not conduct the strike; it was a spontaneous protest by a
number of workers against the wage policies of the employer. The union continued its
organizational efforts during the strike.
* The mistake was due to the great number of layoffs in the seasonal garment indus-
try. In its determination of the total number of employees in the unit, the union failed
to include x2o shipping and production employees who had been temporarily laid-off.
Only 88 of the 12o employees had signed union authorization cards. Consequently, the
union held either x58 authorization cards out of a total of 406 employees-or held 70
authorization cards out of a total of 286. In either view, the union did not have a
majority.
'"Section 8 .... (b) : It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents . .. (x) to restrain or coerce .. . (A) employees in the exercise of the
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Prior to 1957, the Board's findings of "restraint and coercion" under
this section had been limited to cases involving the harsher forms of
oppressive tactics, including economic reprisals, physical violence, in-
timidation, and deliberate deception by the union in conducting organi-
zational activity.5 Curtis Brothers, Inc.,' the first decision to depart
from the pattern of narrow interpretation, held that otherwise lawful
union activity with an unlawful objective constitutes unlawful restraint
and coercion under section 8(b)(i)(A). The objective deemed un-
lawful in that case was a demand that the employer sign a contract
recognizing the minority union's conducting the picketing as exclusive
bargaining agent.7
In as much as the Curtis Brothers case has been reversed,8 the legal
status of the instant decision is at least questionable.9 If the former
decision is truly defunct, 0 and it is lawful for a minority union to picket
peacefully for recognition, it might not be unlawful for the minority
union to effectuate the purpose of such lawful, peaceful picketing by
signing a contract recognizing it as the exclusive bargaining agent.
Closer analysis, however, reveals that the Curtis Brothers and
rights guaranteed in section 72' Section 7 provides that "Employees shall have the-
right . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
. . . shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except" when
subject to a union shop agreement authorized by section 8(a)(3). Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (i) (A), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (x935), as
amended 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(i) (-952).
' Former Member Murdock referred to the Board's previous findings on § 8(b) (1)
(A) in his dissent in Curtis Brothers, Inc., ss 9 N.L.R.B. 232, 261 (1957): "In these-
cases the Board found that section 8(b)(i)(A) covers violence and intimidation by
unions and threats of economic action against specific individuals and is directed at the.
means by which strikes and picketing are conducted, not the object of such activities."
Professor Archibald Cox has surveyed the cases in this area and has reached the same-
conclusion. See editorial comments, Cox, LAJOR LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS 333-37
(Gth ed. 1958).
1 ii9 N.L.R.B. 232 (957).
Recognition of a union in these circumstances would constitute unlawful inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion under section 8(a)(-), and unlawful assistance to the
union under section 8(b)(a). International Metal Prods. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 1076
('953).
'Drivers Union, Local 639 v. NLRB (D.C. Cir.) 43 L.R.R.M. 2156 (1958).
' Although the majority denied that it was relying in whole or in part on the Curtis-
case, the instant decision has been characterized as merely an extension of the discredited
Curtis doctrine by Member Fanning in his dissenting opinion.
" Unless the Board recants or the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals.
for the District of Columbia, a reversal by the latter court will not be effective outside-
the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 27 U.S.L.
WEEK 3293 (U.S. April 20, 1959) (No. 40).
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Bernard-Altmann decisions are concerned with basically different issues.
In the Curtis Brothers case, the Board decided that a union could not
lawfully picket for recognition where the granting of the recognition
would be an illegal act on the part of the employer. 1 The issue in
Bernard-Altmann, on the other hand, was whether the union's mere
participation in an act illegal for the employer should, for this reason
alone, also be illegal for the union. Still another fundamental distinc-
tion between the two decisions is the nature of the coercion involved.
While the Curtis Brothers case was concerned with the indirect eco-
nomic effect upon employees of a picketed employer, the union in
Bernard-Altmann completely pre-empted the employees' choice of repre-
sentatives.
Thus, on two bases, it would appear that the question of whether
picketing for recognition by a minority union is lawful or unlawful may
be distinguished from the question of whether the minority union is
guilty of restraint and coercion if it goes one step further and signs a
contract with the employer.
As a background for consideration of the practical implications of
the instant decision, it should be noted that the legislative history"2 of
section 8(b)(i)(A) leaves considerable doubt whether Congress ever
intended "restraint and coercion" to include such peaceful acts as de
facto representation by a minority union. In the final analysis, how-
ever, the question whether de facto representation by a minority union
actually amounts to coercion and restraint of employees in the exercise
of their section 7 rights must be determined from a consideration of the
practical effects of such representation. The most obvious effect is that
the minority union will be able to negotiate for contract terms establish-
ing wages, hours, and working conditions'8 for all employees in the
" See note 7 supra.
"fDissenting Member Fanning's consideration of statements made in speeches and
during congressional debate by Senators Taft and Ball, two prominent sponsors of the
Taft-Hartley amendments, led him to the conclusion that the language "restraint and
coercion" in section 8(b)(x) (A) was intended to outlaw only such flagrantly abusive
tactics as "cgoon squads," threats of physical violence and economic pressure directed at
individual employees or definite groups of employees. 93 CONG. REc. 4435-36, A 22SZ
(1947). Read in context, however, it is clear that the examples cited in floor debate
were intended to be merely representative and not exclusive. See further statements of
Senator Taft, 93 CoNG. REC. 4435-36 (s947).
Is The union's contract with Bernard-Altmann did not include a union shop clause.
Dissenting Member Fanning stated that the absence of such a contract term was signifi-
cant in his finding that there had been no restraint or coercion of employees' freedom
of choice, thus indicating that had such a clause been in the contract his evaluation of
its effects might have been different.
[Vol. 1959: 62,4
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bargaining unit. But evaluation of the true coercive effect of a minority
union's assumption of the position of bargaining representative cannot
accurately be made without consideration of the several remedies avail-
able to employees, by means of which a minority union may be deprived
of representative status.
Aside from resorting to self-help through legitimate collective
action, any employee14 aggrieved by the situation may file unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB alleging violations of sections 8 (a) (i)
and 8(a) (2) on the part of the employer. Upon a finding of an unfair
labor practice, the NLRB would issue a "cease and desist" order direct-
ing the employer to refrain from recognizing the union.'5 Should a
substantial number of the employees desire a different union as its repre-
sentative, that rival union or any other employee may petition the
NLRB for a representation election upon a showing that thirty per cent
of the employees in the bargaining unit desire such an election.'6 This
remedy, however, is limited by the contract-bar rule which generally
prevents a rival union from obtaining an election within two years after
the signing of the collective bargaining contract. 7 Furthermore, sub-
ject to the contract-bar rules, decertification procedures could be utilized
to establish officially the minority status of the union currently being
recognized by the employer. 8 The only additional remedy which the
instant decision adds to the employees' arsenal of defenses is the power
to file an unfair labor practice charge under section 8(b)(i)(A)-a
power which already is available under sections 8(a)(i) and 8(a)(2),
though these latter sections are directed at the employer and not the
union.' 9 In any event, the sanctions of the Board would be invoked to
" The National Labor Relations Board Statements of Procedure, #1 11o.o2, authorizes
any person to file an unfair labor practice charge. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (Supp. 1959).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § xo(c), 49 Stat. 449,
453 (x935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 16o(c) (1952) ; 22N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 62 (1957).
%a 29 C.F.R. § 1o.17-x8 (Supp. 1959).
"The Board's contract-bar doctrine would not prevent an election upon petition by
a rival union if the agreement signed were a bare recognition agreement not containing
substantial terms and conditions of employment. Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., ixi
N.L.R.B. No. 149 (.958).
" Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(c) (x) (A) (ii), 49
Stat. 4491 453 (1935), as amended, 6x Stat. 136, 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)
(a) (ii) (7952). The National Labor Relations Board Statements of Procedure, Series
1, authorizes any employee to file a petition for such an election. 29 C.F.R. § 101.17
(SuPP. "1959)..
... 1 2! It 'must bd recognized that, from the employer's point of view, a determination
that the union was also guilty of 4n.unfair labor practice would be desirable for the
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end representation by and recognition of the minority union. In view
of these remedies available to the employees, by which their right to
free choice of bargaining representatives can be vindicated, it would
seem that de facto representation by a minority union is not the drastic
type of compulsion which should fall within "restraint and coercion,"
but is an act of a type generally, and more properly, denominated
"interference."
This decision also involves federal labor policy considerations which
indicate that a different rule might be more desirable. It seems fair to
say that the decision could have the effect of discouraging the signing
of collective bargaining contracts because it requires that a union act
therein at its peril, good faith being expressly excluded as a defense.
A union may be faced with serious difficulty in ascertaining the exact
number of employees in a bargaining unit. This certainly would be
true in highly seasonal and cyclical industries in which large scale lay-
offs are common. 0 Hence, at any given moment the exact number of
employees may be in doubt or may be reasonably, but mistakenly, ascer-
tained. Furthermore, should the employer be negligent in supplying
the union with the correct number of employees in a bargaining unit
from the payroll records, the union, under the rule of the instant de-
cision, must share the risk of committing an unfair labor practice.
All of these considerations may discourage2' unions from signing
collective bargaining contracts because none of these circumstances
would be considered a legitimate defense and because the necessity for
making a determination of majority status would cause delay at the
most critical point in negotiations-just prior to signing. Even though
the Taft-Hartley Act has retreated from the Wagner Act position of
vigorously encouraging the formation of collective bargaining contracts,
there is still a very strong national policy favoring industrial stability
reason that it would foreclose adverse publicity emphasizing only the employer's cul-
pability.
'O Technically, laid-off workers are still employees, but some of them may have
obtained permanent equivalent employment elsewhere, in which case they would no
longer be so regarded. American Cyanamid Co., 59 N.L.R.B. ioz6 (1940).
" The deterrent effect of the decision is two-fold. In Bernard-Altmann, the Board's
order directed the union to cease acting as bargaining representative until it had demon-
strated its majority status in a Board-conducted election. This is a prerequisite not
otherwise mandatory which the union might very well desire to avoid because of the
delay involved, and because of the ever present possibility of losing the election, which
would foreclose additional elections for at least one year. Furthermore, a finding of
unfair labor practice by the union would create a psychological atmosphere unfavorable
to furtherance of the union's organizational activities.
[Vol. x959: 6z4.
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which is enhanced by the signing of such contracts.2" Discouragement
of collective bargaining contracts is obviously not consonant with na-
tional labor policy. It would be unfortunate if Bernard-Altmann should
have that undesirable effect.
" It was the conflict between the two fundamental policies favoring a stabilized
bargaining relationship and freedom of choice of bargaining representatives that gave
rise to the contract bar doctrine.
